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ABSTRACT
Although Gadamer's aesthetic writings are aimed at dismantling the scientific
method's monopoly on truth-claims, they also constitute an aesthetic theory in
themselves. This theory is the application of Gadamer's anti-methodological stance to the
process of artistic interpretation in an attempt to give artworks the right to make credible
claims about reality and escape the "aesthetic consciousness" that prevents art from
making these claims. To describe the mechanics of this process, Gadamer employs the
concepts of play, symbol, and festival to showcase how artworks relate to history and
tradition, how they disrupt the subject-object relationship, and how their persistent
character provides a constant source of self-understanding for an audience. This thesis
intends to show that this attack on aesthetic consciousness is the focus of Gadamer's
aesthetic theory, and that the concepts of play, symbol, and festival, in their relation to his
concept of Erfahrung, are the means of this attack.
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Introduction
To claim that an artwork is a statement of some kind is to claim what many people take
for granted. Indeed, it is hard to deny that an artwork is speaking to us, given its presence as
something that can be encountered and questioned. It is making a case for something, and its
physical arrangement represents this case for its audience. As members of the audience, we
interact with it, in that we devote our senses to understanding what it is trying to say, and through
this process we allow it draw a question from us-"What is this?" Certainly, this is not the only
question it draws. "What is it?" is another possibility, along with a host of others. But the first
question goes beyond the second, which sees the artwork as an object in all its otherness, limiting
our understanding of its relation to the whole of our human experience. Asking "What is this" is
to bring the artwork into the midst of the subject, and into the subject's present moment of
experience, as if they are admitting that their understanding of reality must make allowance for
the artwork's presence. To acknowledge the "this-ness" of the artwork is to acknowledge the
existence of something outside oneself, a thing that can be distinguished from other things, yet
bound to the reality that both object and subject occupy. To question an artwork's existence in
this way is to inquire into, not just what it says, but the means by which it makes a statement.
With our subjectivity so thoroughly disrupted by the artwork's presence, our questions are
directed not only at the work, but at ourselves in relation to it. What does the this-ness of an
artwork say, through the subject matter it depicts, about the this-ness of us? Now the tables have
turned; art is no longer just making a statement about itself, but a statement about its audience. It
is forcing its witnesses to produce a response to its claim, and in doing so, the witnesses receive
knowledge of themselves. They make associations between the elements of the work they
recognize, and the elements that remain unfamiliar. The artwork expands the audience's
understanding of the world, and by proxy, their situation within it.
This is the point that Hans-Georg Gadamer makes in his aesthetic writings (specifically
in Truth and Method and The Relevance ofthe Beautiful). An aesthetic experience is something
connected to us, which speaks to our relationship with the world. In order to understand what an
artwork is saying, everything we have come to know is drawn out of us. To enter into this
understanding means that we are leveraging our fore-conception of reality-that is, the set of
preconceptions that constitute our knowledge-in order to recognize the points of familiarity that
artwork holds for us. In doing so, the aspects of the artwork that appear unfan1iliar to us become
understood more fully and are added to the collection of things we know. The interpretation of
artwork is the cycle of movement between things recognized and things not, so that the
unfamiliar is made recognizable. Art's ability to generate new understandings in us, by building
on what we have come to know, is what makes art intrinsic to our reality, and embedded within
the historical tradition that binds us together. Through this embeddedness, an artwork constantly
adds to our experience as we struggle to make sense of what it has to say. And when we uncover
what this meaning is, based on its relation to things we know, we discover the truth of an
artwork-the self-understanding that it provides us with. An artwork's presence is the source of
this truth, because it ratifies our connection to the world and to history. By embracing the
otherness of an artwork, we no longer see reality as a subjective projection, but as a network of
inter-subjective relationships that constantly generates newness within the framework of a living
history. Art brings the past into the present, awakening our understanding of not only the
experience we have had before, but also of the experiences yet to come.
This is not the way artworks are often perceived, however. With the rise of the scientific
method throughout the Enlightenment, tradition was subsequently devalued. Art could no longer
be regarded as having a claim to truth, because the variability of artistic interpretations was seen
to be incompatible with science's search for experimental consistency. As well, art's relation to
history was equally repugnant for the Enlightenment, because the "old ways" of pre-
Enlightenment Europe were being devalued and ignored. The progress promised by science
stood in contrast to the "false" ideas of history, which were seen as the product of dogma. And
because of art's dependency on history, and all the unscientific, mythic ideas of the past, art
could no longer be seen as the beholder of truth. Because of this, the Enlightenment presented art
with an ultimatum: it must renounce its claim to truth, or be completely replaced by science as
the source of culture. The response by artists was to submit to the first proposition, and make art
something altogether "other" than what practical, empirical reality could provide. This attitude,
that art can no longer provide us with truth, is what fostered "aesthetic consciousness", and
removed the experience of art from the experience of life.
In response, Gadamer proposes that art's claim to truth has been unfairly ignored, and
that it is time to re-integrate art with truth. In order to do so, he casts the interpretation of art as a
"play-experience", in which a dialogue takes place between the artwork and subject, to the extent
that the subject fuses their understanding of history with the artwork. The concept of play, in this
sense, is what allows Gadamer to state that the ontological existence of an artwork is the source
of its truth, because it can deliver a representation of something to us, something that broadens
our understanding of the world, making our perception of ourselves and life in general clearer
and less distorted by our own subjectivity. His notion of aesthetic consciousness as incompatible
with the play-experience is expounded upon by two other concepts, symbol and festival. It is
these, he believes, that demonstrate how the play-experience manifests through language, and
how approaching art in this way escapes the need to separate the experience of art from the
experience of reality. Through play, symbol, and festival, Gadamer re-integrates art with the
historical tradition in which all existence is embedded, granting art the ability to provide us with
self-understanding, and rejecting aesthetic consciousness as the enemy of this provision.
Chapter 1: The Nature and History of Aesthetic Consciousness
I. The Meta-Prejudice of the Enlightenment
Aesthetic consciousness is the view that the truth expressed through the experience of an
artwork (Erlebniskunst) cannot be related to any other mode of experience. I This phenomenon,
Gadamer believes, is a product of the Enlightenment's focus on scientific methodology as the
solely reliable means of achieving truth. In its pursuit offalsifiable, experimentally consistent
data, the Enlightenment began to diminish the importance of the human preconceptions of
reality-or prejudices, as Gadamer calls them-that constitute our foreknowledge. In other
words, the Enlightenment believed that the human fore-conception of reality, which is what
conditions how a human being perceives the world, was no longer an appropriate starting point
for human understanding. This resulted in the emergence ofa "prejudice against prejudices",
which sought to eliminate, (or at the very least, discredit) those conclusions about the world that
were devised prior to the emergence of the scientific method? The search for conclusive data
through repeatable experimentation became one of the Enlightenment's primary goals, and as
such, preconceptions about reality were no longer the driving force behind understanding, but
were instead seen as obstacles to it. Without the rational spirit of Enlightenment thinking to
guide our investigation of the world, past judgments and assumptions were devalued and
disregarded as flawed, and the historicity of understanding was ifnot denied, overlooked. As
Gadamer writes:
1 Jason Paul Bourgeois, The Aesthetic Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Vrs van Balthasar (New
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007),51.
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 1989), 272.
[The Enlightenment] wants to understand tradition...rationally and without
prejudice. But there is a special difficulty about this, since the sheer fact that
something is written down gives it special authority... the Enlightenment tends to
accept no authority and to decide everything before the judgment seat of
reason... [thus] it is not tradition but reason that constitutes the ultimate source of
all authority. We can know better: this is the maxim with which the modern
Enlightenment approaches tradition...3
This passage neatly summarizes the Enlightenment's skepticism toward the historicity of
phenomena. No longer could tradition be automatically granted authority by virtue of its
historical relationship to human experience, because to do so would be an act of dogmatic
submission to tradition. Instead, tradition must be taken as an object of critique, and viewed
through the lens of rational skepticism.4 To do any less would be to abandon the courage that, as
the Enlightenment believed, allows us to make use of our own understanding, without allowing
our foreknowledge to override our rational powers.s History, theology and art quickly fell out of
the Enlightenment's purview, and as its natural scientific methodology established itself as the
sole carrier of truth, it threatened the credibility of those fields whose natures stood in contrast to
it. The reason for this contrast was the distinction imposed by the Enlightenment, between a faith
in authority and faith in one's own capacity for reason. Despite the fact that authority is a
testament to one's knowledge, it was perceived as a dogmatic phenomenon by the
Enlightenment, because its ability to condition human behaviour suggested a blind obedience to
3 Gadamer, TM,272.
4 Gadamer, TM,272.
5 Gadamer,TM,271.
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prior knowledge. 6 Those with authority are expected to provide answers regarding the things we
encounter, overriding our own investigations and imbuing those more experienced with a greater
degree of influence over the way we think. Thus, Enlightenment thinkers diminished the
importance of knowledge that could not be obtained through the natural scientific methodology
that it upheld, resulting in the diminishment of knowledge obtained through authority and
tradition.
II. The Romantic Reaction
Romanticism was the reaction to this threat, as it sought to revitalize interest in those
fields that the Enlightenment was determined to neglect. But Gadamer makes it clear that this
reaction did not undo the unhistorical fallacy brought about by the Enlightenment; rather, it
served to deepen it. Instead of allowing their work to reveal truth by virtue of its subject matter
and relation to human experience, the artists, historians, and philologists of the Romantic period
began to assert their respective fields as above and beyond the domain of everyday human
experience.
In contrast to the Enlightenment's faith in perfection..we now find that...the
world of myth, unreflective life, not yet analyzed away by consciousness, in a
'society close to nature'...acquire[s] a romantic magic, even a priority over
truth... [thus] the romantic reversal of the Enlightenment's criteria of value
actually perpetuates the abstract contrast between myth and reason. 7
Gadamer is saying that Romanticism's rejection of the Enlightenment falls into the same anti-
traditional extremism that plagued the latter. The only difference is that now, instead of pure,
6 Gadamer, TM,279.
7 Gadamer, TM,273.
absolute knowledge becoming the normative standard of thought, the collective, primeval
consciousness believed to have existed prior to the Enlightenment is being held in the same
regard.
The fallacy here, as Gadamer illustrates, is that the Romanticists uphold myth as
something antithetical to reason in an attempt to form a bulwark against rationalism. In fact, the
opposite is true-myth is derived from reason. The component of myth is what allows a
collective consciousness to move beyond ritual and fear, and to attain knowledge of how it is
situated in relation to things outside itself. Collective consciousness creates a dialogue with the
divine through myth, and through this dialogue the collective can overcome its alienation from
the divine, the divine being that which allows things to exist independent of the collective's
influence. In other words, myth functions as the interpreter between a culture and the unknown,
demystifying those aspects of existence that cannot be adequately explained through method, and
the revelation of these aspects constitutes not a collective innocence (or to use Gadamer's words,
"primeval stupidity"), but a collective knowledge. s
The second part of this romantic fallacy is the division between mythic and poetic
thought, a division that feeds directly into the creation of aesthetic consciousness. Gadamer
believes that this division of mythic perspectives arose from the belief that poetic accounts of
myth constitute subjective distortions of the myths that bind communities, and that while these
accounts may stir the passions of their readers, they have little to offer in the way of truth.9
Ironically, the "abstract contrast between myth and reason" that the Romanticists railed against
becomes an analogue to a contrast of their own, in which myth has taken the place of reason and
8 Gadamer, TM,274.
9 Gadamer, TM,274.
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art has taken myth's former place. lo Therefore, the ensuing hypocrisy that overtakes the
Romantic cause lies in the attempted fusion of Enlightenment concerns with historical
revivalism. As quickly as Romanticism defends what it takes to be an innocent, bygone era of
mythic togetherness, it diminishes the credibility of poets and artists to convey their
understanding of the tradition they inhabit. Thus, both Romanticism and the Enlightenment
constitute the same break with the continuity of meaning found in tradition. II The only
difference between them lies in their respective normative values-reason for the Enlightenment,
myth for Romanticism-which are inflated to compensate for the absence of historical continuity
in each. The Romantic fixation on myth and history does not re-introduce these concepts to the
human experience of the present, but instead analyzes them abstractly. Rather than providing
context for present events, and allowing this context to build upon our understanding of the
present, the past is treated as a kind of museum piece-it can stimulate interest in the events and
relics of history, but beyond this it is largely reduced to a form ofnovelty.12 With history's
relation to the present so obscured, the culture to which it belongs is persuaded to regard it from
a position of detached bemusement, subsequently isolating it from the tradition that binds the
culture in the first place. This attitude is directly responsible for the advent of aesthetic
consciousness, but to understand why, we must analyze Gadamer's critique of Kant's aesthetics
and the Romantic reaction that followed.
Gadamer believes that the radical subjectivization of art that began with Kant is the cause
of aesthetic consciousness, because Kant's establishment of taste as the primary factor in
understanding artworks led to the detachment of art from a shared human experience (i.e.
10 Gadamer, TM,274.
11 Gadamer, TM,275.
12 Gadamer, TM,275.
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tradition). For Kant, taste is the faculty of reflective judgment, as conditioned by a normative
value of beauty. Through the principle of taste, Kant diminished the objective, ontological reality
of artworks, in favour of how well they embody the standard of beauty. In the case of Kant,
beauty is the manifestation of moral truth, and our receptivity to beauty determines our access to
the sublime. Gadarner observes a tension between the Kantian concepts of genius and taste, in
that Kant ascribes greater significance to taste, while giving genius secondary status in his
argument. As Gadarner writes, "I maintain that for Kant the concept of genius was really only a
complement to what was of interest to him 'for transcendental reasons' in aesthetic
judgment. .. applying aesthetic judgment to the beautiful and sublime in nature is more important
than the transcendental foundation of art.,,13 Much like Truth and Method's own use of
aesthetics to prove a larger argument about truth, Kant leveraged aesthetics in the first volume of
the Critique ofJudgment to support his teleological argument in the second. It is this aim of
legitimizing the teleology of nature that demands taste be accorded a more significant position
because taste is the means by which human beings are made aware of beauty, thus cultivating us
socially and providing us with a pleasure of reflection that is cognitive, and not physical, in
nature. 14 Yet despite the primacy of taste, Kant still considers genius to be the means by which
human beings create artworks on par with natural beauty. Genius-as the synthesis of
understanding and imagination-is what allows human artworks to become beautiful. Thus it is
beauty that enjoins taste with genius in that beautiful artworks are judged by taste and made
manifest through genius. IS
I'Gadamer,TM,54-55.
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power ofJudgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),185.
IS Kant, Critique ofJudgment, 189.
However, Gadamer believes that Kant's claims regarding beauty are inadequate, because
taste, which is our means of locating where the beautiful lies, places a restriction on the beautiful
without any defining principle of its own. 16 In an attempt to provide taste with this defining
principle, thus making it compatible with the objective character of beauty, Kant standardizes
taste with the concept of the perfection oftaste. Although this standardization can support itself
in terms of an artwork's beauty-given that human artwork is consciously influenced by
standards oftaste-Gadamer believes it falls flat when applied to instances of natural beauty,
because nature operates independently from the conscious creativity of genius. Therefore, any
attempt to standardize our judgments of nature's beauty will result in even more radically
subjective judgments of taste, because the genius that could otherwise embody the principles of
taste is absent from natural activity.17 The ensuing diversity ofjudgments only underscores the
relativity of human taste, and fails to bind it under a singular, normative value. Genius, on the
other hand, does not possess this open-endedness. It employs a specific language through art,
which is grounded in a human understanding oflife that allows its subject matter to be more
explicitly conveyed to an audience. Whereas our recognition of beauty in nature relies on our
own, subjective mood, the products of genius have definiteness in what they say, which is what
truly engages the free play of our cognitive faculties. 18 Although Gadamer does not necessarily
prefer genius to taste as a guiding principle for aesthetics, he does believe that "genius is
ultimately a manifestation of this vivifying spirit for, as opposed to the pedant's rigid adherence
to rules, genius exhibits a free sweep of innovation and thus the originality that creates new
models.,,19 As that which creates beauty, rather than that which affirms or denies the beauty of
:: Gadamer, TM,S7.
Gadamer, TM,S7.
:: Gadamer, TM,Sl-S2.
Gadamer,TM,S3.
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what is created, genius promotes the willingness to disrupt convention and enrich the subject's
understanding of themselves and their world. But at the same time, the concept of taste has a
similar interest for Gadamer, due to the historicity it provides. The concept of what is tasteful
changes from culture to culture, and it is through this cultural taste that our interpretation of art
reveals its connection to history. What a culture considers "tasteful" is a part of its tradition, and
informs the members of that culture as to how they stand in relation to that tradition. As he
writes, "One does violence to the concept of taste if one does not accept its variability ... [and
genius] fulfills ... the requirement of being immutable in the streanl oftime.,,2o Despite his
appreciation for the historicity of taste, his sentiments toward genius exhibit a stronger
commonality with Romanticism, in that natural beauty and taste, having been found
incompatible with each other, are diminished in favour of genius. But this commonality should
not be taken for granted; it is in Romanticism that Gadamer's aesthetic critique becomes even
more pointed, as he takes aim at the cult of genius it fostered, and the aesthetic consciousness
that resulted from it.
As mentioned earlier, the Romantic movement attempted to break away from the
prejudice against prejudices-or "meta-prejudice"-of the Enlightenment, and elevate the
significance of the human sciences above the Enlightenment's elevation of reason. But the divide
between myth and reason was only further deepened by the efforts of Romanticism, resulting in
the abstraction of the very concepts it sought to demystify.2J Two factors reveal the relationship
between these efforts and aesthetic consciousness: I) German Idealism's reversal of the Kantian
priority of taste, and 2) the resulting focus on Erlebnis as the ultimate unit of consciousness. In
the first case, Gadamer claims that the shift from taste to genius began with Fichte and Schelling,
20 Gadamer,TM,58.
21 Gadamer, TM,273.
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with their establishment of genius as the universal aesthetic principle. The standpoint ofart as
the unconscious production of genius became for the Idealists the only standpoint for aesthetics
at all. 22 Gadamer states that, initially, it was the goal of the Idealists to use the newfound
superiority of genius as a bridge between genius and nature, thus defining nature as the product
of spirit?3 By extending the concept of genius into the domain of natural science, the Idealists
were able to make a case for art's claim to truth in a way that did not have to appeal to a
standardization of taste. Gadamer's footnote regarding Friedrich Schlegel illuminates the
conclusion of this theory: if the standpoint of art is conditioned by the inflation of genius, then
taste becomes untenable as a universal aesthetic principle.24 But there is a problem with this
approach-if taste is completely ignored as a principle, our understanding of the artwork's
historicity becomes more limited. As discussed, taste is not only a subjective property, but a
culturally held one. Taste defines how a culture perceives itself, and illustrates the kinds of
things that culture finds acceptable. It provides access into the prejudices of a particular tradition,
and although the standardizing of taste can prevent a culture from critically assessing these
prejudices, acknowledging the influence of them at least gives the culture some knowledge of
what these prejudices are. By ignoring taste completely, and advocating genius in place of it,
Gadamer believes Romanticism has merely gone from one aesthetic dogma to the other. The
authority of tradition, which would otherwise determine an artwork's congruence with a
culturally-held standard of taste, is being deprived of its claim to make any such assertion.
Instead, the role of the artist, as the one who applies their genius to the creation of art, is given
the authority to dictate not only the claim the artwork is making, but the standard by which the
work ought to be judged. Gadamer is not advocating one principle over the other, but is
~: Gadamer, TM,58.
24 Gadamer,TM,58.
Gadamer, TM,58.
expressing the extent to which taste and genius have each been radicalized, and how this
radicalization can stifle an artwork's ability to speak for itselfas a historically-grounded object
that invites us to discover its meaning.
Recognizing this dismissal of taste, Hegel manages to assert a new aesthetic principle:
man's encounter with himself. 25 We will see that this moment of self-encounter will be the
inspiration for Gadamer's antidote to aesthetic consciousness and will deeply influence his
critique of subject-centric models of interpretation. For our current purposes, it will suffice to say
that for Hegel, the work of art constitutes the dissolution of the divide between subject and
object.26 As the encounter with a work of art proceeds, the subject discovers correlations between
their particular life experience and the subject matter of the artwork, which allow the subject to
understand themselves better. But the rejection of Hegel by the neo-Kantians kept this concept of
self-understanding largely dormant, and the elevation of genius, as committed by the Idealists
and fathered by Kant, re-established itself as the dominant aesthetic principle.27 Gadamer
believes that defining art through the concept of genius has only served to deprive artworks of
their claim to truth, leading to the rise of aesthetic consciousness. This deprivation, Gadamer
states, was given its primary justification through the concept of Erlebnis, and it is the neo-
Kantians' popularizing of this concept that severed art from the tradition in which human
experience is embedded.
The concepts of Erlebnis and Erfahrung are contrasting modes of human experience.
Erlebnis refers to experience as a particular instance that is so fully understood, the subject gains
25 Gadamer, TM,59.
26 Jeff Mitscherling, "Hegelian Elements in Gadamer's Notions of Application and Play," in Continental Philosophy
Review (Vol. 25, No. ll,66.
21 Gadamer, TM,60.
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total self-knowledge from it, and will never be able to, nor need to, return to that experience
again in order to understand it. In this sense, Erlebnis remains isolated from other experiences, in
that a moment ofErlebnis cannot form the basis for understanding successive experiences. It is a
precious thing that can never be repeated or built upon. Erfahrung, on the other hand, denotes
experience as an ongoing, transformative process (what has been referred to as "continuous
human experience", or "human experience" up to this point). With Erfahrung, a single moment
is related to the larger whole of a person's experience, with each moment bringing the whole into
greater clarity. To explore this contrast in greater detail, Erlebnis will be broken down further.
Erlebnis is so immediately and fully grasped that it becomes separated from the continuity of
life; a moment so remarkable that it does not need to be contextualized in order to be fully
understood.28 Although an instance of Erlebnis may have profound significance for the subject, it
is exhaustible in terms of the understanding it provides. The nature of understanding as a
developmental process, as it is under Erfahrung, becomes ignored in favour of the instantaneous,
"absolute knowledge" of the experience that Erlebnis is assun1ed to possess. From this, it is clear
that the nature of Erlebnis forms a direct analogue with the nature of aesthetic consciousness.
With aesthetic consciousness, the artwork undergoes an abstraction "from all the conditions of a
work's accessibility,,29, in that the work's connection to the past-whether in terms of the
conditions of its creation, or the various interpretations of it recorded over the years--displace it
from Erfahrung, and thus prevent the subject from gaining any self-understanding from it.3D In
other words, because the artwork is so removed from the context Erfahrung provides, it is kept
from the history of our experiences; the artwork's meaning is considered "too pure" to be
28 Tracie Constantino, "Philosophical Hermeneutics as a Theoretical Framework for Understanding Works of Art,"
inArtsandLearningResearch,ed.Joan Russell and Regina MurphY,VoI,19, No. 1(2002-2003),83.
29 Gadamer, TM,85.
30 Constantino, Understanding Works ofArt, 84.
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understood by all but the most sensitive connoisseurs. Moreover, the "absolute knowledge" of
Erlebnis prevents the subject from remaining open to new experiences, a crucial element that
Erfahrung accommodates.
The abstraction caused by aesthetic consciousness is what Gadarner terms "aesthetic
differentiation", which is the process of removing the experience of an artwork from the
experiential flow of one's life, thus exalting it as the standard of an aesthetic ideal, one that
permits access to a form of knowledge that is all-encompassing and absolute. 31 This, Gadarner
believes, is to not only overextend the significance of an artwork's subject matter, but to abstract
it to the extent that the subject's experience of it takes precedence over the historicity of the
artwork itself (i.e. how it is conditioned by historical tradition). As Gadarner writes:
In the experience of art is present a fullness of meaning that belongs not only to
this particular content or object but rather stands for the meaningful whole of life.
An aesthetic Erlebnis always contains the experience of an infinite whole.
Precisely because it does not combine with other experiences to make one open
experiential flow, but immediately represents the whole, its significance is
infinite.32
Removing a single experience from the influence of other experiences is to give that experience
a place of privilege. The significance of Erlebnis is justified on the grounds that in its
uniqueness, it alone must represent the nature of every experience, and therefore be the source of
absolute knowledge. Gadamer's criticism of Hegel shows the fallacy in this kind of thinking, and
how it is the foundation for aesthetic differentiation. Gadarner claims that, for Hegel, the ultimate
:: Gadamer,TM,70.
Gadamer, TM,70.
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goal of conscious experience is the acquisition of total self-knowledge, which is the experience
that consciousness has of itselrJ3Because this self-knowledge is so complete, it overcomes the
need to include, let alone acknowledge, anything foreign or alien; i.e. that which would stand in
contrast to it. Thus, the acquisition of self-knowledge in this way does not incorporate
Erfahrung, but instead overcomes it, in order to completely recognize the identity of
consciousness and object (i.e. the identity ofself-knowledge).34 The only way the truth of self-
knowledge can be achieved, Hegel believes, is through science, because science allows us,
through the dialectic of question and answer, to discover ourselves in that which is foreign.
Although both Gadamer and Hegel agree on the nature of dialectic inquiry as the provider of
self-understanding, Hegel's reliance on scientific methodology is the breaking point between the
two. Hegel's belief in scientific methodology, to uncover the familiar within the alien, ends up
disregarding the alien in favour of the familiar. The self-knowledge derived through this method
is a result of the subject projecting their current self-understanding onto the object. But this self-
understanding is a product of their fore-conception of reality, making it a product of their
prejudices. We can see the Enlightenment's meta-prejudice pulling the strings here. But
interestingly, under Hegel's model, two sets of prejudices are involved. Not only does the
scientific methodology itself constitute a prejudice, but so too is the subject's self-understanding
prior to encountering the object. Gadamer believes that Hegel's system undermines itself,
because the subject's attempt at attaining a pure, universal, unbiased form of self-knowledge is
grounded in subjective preconceptions. In addition, the view that this self-knowledge is absolute
means that not only are the subject's prejudices being used to reveal the truth, but they are no
longer being challenged by the dialogical nature of inquiry; thus once the subject attains self-
33 Gadamer, TM,355.
34 Gadamer, TM,355.
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knowledge from the object, they are discouraged from inquiring into its nature any further,
leading the dialectic to a dead end. This unwillingness to explore is because the subject's
recognition of themselves in the object is regarded as "complete", which satisfies the
expectations dictated by the subject's prejudices. This is the fallacy of Erlebnis, and it
underscores the problem of trying to derive infinite knowledge from particular experiences.
By contrast, Gadamer's advocacy of Erfahrung seeks to acknowledge our current
situation, by constantly building on what we already know.35 For him, the infinite is not found in
the truth provided by a particular experience, because to remove a particular experience from the
continuous flow of Erfahrung results in its abstraction, which serves to make it a paradigm for
every other human experience. This, Gadamer believes, is to disregard the historical conditions
that lead to those experiences, which deprives the subject of understanding how these
experiences influence each other. Moreover, experiences which are not seen as constituting an
Erlebnis run the risk of being dismissed entirely. In this way, Erlebnis can be seen as the
Enlightenment's meta-prejudice in disguise, in its use of science to confine the subject's
experience to the domain of the familiar and unchallenging. By contrast, Gadamer's system does
not represent the infinite through the nature of self-knowledge; the infinite is revealed in the
nature of dialectic inquiry-the synthesis of "question" and "answer" continues indefinitely, with
the object providing the subject with self-knowledge, for as long as the subject chooses to engage
in a dialogue with the object. In turn, the subject is encouraged to engage in further encounters
with the object, and receive new forms of self-knowledge with each successive encounter.
Gadamer summarizes this phenomenon neatly in his own words: "The dialectic of experience
has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is
35 Gadamer,TM,357.
made possible by experience itself.,,36 It is Erfahrung, and not Elebnis, that allows experiences to
couch themselves within the linear flow of human life, therefore allowing the subject to remain
open to new experiences, and to clearly perceive the connections between them. Erfahrung
provides events with the ability to influence each other, which in turn allows past events to
provide context for present ones, and present events to reveal the aim of prior ones. As the
subject moves through the past into the future, regarding these events as elements of Erfahrung
integrates the subject's situation with their embeddedness within history, to the extent that the
subject is open to successive experiences, rather than assuming that one particular experience is
all that is needed to understand oneself.
This willingness to experiencefurlher becomes the basis of the concept of play, and it is
the spirit of play that allows aesthetic experience to return to the model of Erfahrung. But before
we can see how this return occurs, and how it imbues art with its claim to truth, we must
understand the extent of Erlebnis' influence on aesthetic theory. This extent is demonstrated by
what Gadamer calls "pure perception", and it serves to reinforce aesthetic differentiation-art's
removal from the real. Pure perception is a form of aesthetic interpretation, in which the
interpreting subject abstracts their perception of an artwork, until the artwork is no longer seen
within the context of human experience. In other words, pure perception keeps an audience from
making connections between the things an artwork depicts, and things in reality.37 This is an
expansion of the "sensitive connoisseur" example mentioned earlier, in that deriving meaning
from an artwork becomes an act of cultivating one's receptivity to the genius that the artwork
displays, rather than articulating the work's meaning through its relation to other elements. Thus
through pure perception, aesthetic consciousness acquires a methodology rooted in Erlebnis,
:: Gadamer,TM,3SS.
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which stands in contrast to the binding quality of Erjahrung.38 Gadamer claims that "seeing is
articulating", highlighting the need to relate the subject matter of an artwork to the elements of
reality that surround it-the history of its creation, the time in which it was made, the biography
of its creator, even the space in which it resides. The relation of an artwork to things in the world,
and not to some abstract, universal concept, is what imbues the work with meaning, making
aesthetic experience a constructed event, and one that involves an understanding of a work's
real-world context.39 Pure perception is an attempt to escape this model of understanding.
Aesthetic differentiation demands that a "perverse formalism" be enforced on the artwork, in that
its subject matter, its content, is being abstracted to the extent that the form4o of the artwork is the
audience's focus. 41 This diminishing of an artwork's content is a direct by-product of Erlebnis
and the inflation of genius. The artist is thus perceived by society as having a messianic
importance; they are regarded as a conduit to the divine, as made manifest by their artistic
achievements. Gadamer seeks to undo this perspective. Even "abstract art", with its focus on
nonobjective expression and lack of recognizable forms, has the capacity to make objective
truth-claims. These kinds of artworks still contain their own content and meaning, but the subject
must scrutinize them more carefully, and meditate on their connection to reality with greater
mental focus. 42 An artwork's lack of recognizability does not deprive it of its content, leaving it
an empty vessel to be filled by the subjects' interpretations, but simply issues a greater challenge
for the subject's cognitive abilities. Abstract artworks make the "agony of seeing" more
38 Gadamer, TM,97.
39 Constantino, Understanding WarksafArt, 88.
40 "Form" in the sense of an aesthetic mode or genre (eg. "Art for art's sake"), not form in terms of shape, line,
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palpable, and therefore make relating the work to reality more ofa struggle.43 But this struggle
never precludes the artwork's relationship to reality, as aesthetic consciousness would have us
believe it does. It is only the subject's unwillingness to relate the alien to the familiar that leads
them to abstract the alien, because doing so allows the subject to relate the alien to the universal,
safely eliminating the possibility of error. Who is to say the sculpture doesn't represent an
universal concept, such as "love", or "nature", or "harmony"? There is an interpretive laziness
here, in that the agony of seeing, and the struggle to articulate what is being seen, is sidestepped
for the incontestable safety of universal concepts, which although intangible, are at least mentally
graspable, and therefore, familiar.
This is the trajectory of aesthetic consciousness-from the inadequacy oftaste to the
inflation of genius, the rise of aesthetic differentiation, and the dogma of pure perception.
Gadamer's advocacy here, of engaging with the unfanliliar, is the resulting antidote to this
dogma, and its compatibility with Erfahrung is made clear in the concept of play.
43 Gadamer,TM,91.
Chapter 2: The Function of Dialogue in Play and Horizons
I. Play and the Fusion of Horizons
For Gadamer, the nature of play stands in direct opposition to aesthetic consciousness,
making the play-experience a direct expression of Erfahrung. Gadamer defines playas a "to-and-
fro movement that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end ... it renews itselfin
constant repetition".44 In this sense, play is non-teleological, in that its movement is not tied to a
particular outcome beyond the confines of the play-experience. The most basic examples of play,
Gadamer says, are phenomena such as the "play oflight" or "play of the waves"; even the nature
of words, gears, and limbs apply to this kind of dialogical movement.45 In each case, we have a
set of participants-the gears, waves, or rays of light-that are constrained to a set of relational
boundaries. The waves crash against each other and the shore-these phenomena represent a
group of "players" in that they continuously, repetitively collide with one another, for no
particular purpose.46 They do not move as they do by virtue of their existence alone, as this
would assume that it is their nature to crash into each other, suggesting their behaviour has a
teleological significance outside of their actions. Instead, they crash in relation to the conditions
established by gravitational forces, which allow for the waves' behaviour to exist. This is the
model Gadamer uses to explain the behaviour of play. Like the waves, the participants in any
kind of play are subordinate to the conditions that bring their play-experience into being. The
implications that this model has for aesthetic consciousness demonstrate how untenable the latter
really is. From the perspective ofplay, the experience of aI1 (Erlebniskunst) is no longer defined
by the subjectivity of the interpreter, but by the work of art itself, as it establishes the
44 Gadamer,TM,103.
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conditions-the rules ofthe game-that determine to what extent the interpreter will lose
themselves in the work.47
The act of "losing oneself' is essential to the concept of play, as it illustrates the
connection between play and Erfahrung. To explain it, Gadamer outlines a system of
understanding that accounts for the players' loss of subjectivity. But to understand this system,
we must first see its roots in his later section on horizons of understanding, which helps clarify
the relationship between Erfahrung and play. Gadamer's view of horizons is tied to the need for
understanding what history gives to us, in the present. What we know of the past is the
connection between our present awareness of the world and the tradition to which we are a part;
this much we learned from the preceding chapter. But what is the barrier to understanding this
tradition, which grounds our present awareness within the historical substantiality it provides?
This would be human finitude, because it showcases the extent to which we are bound to the
present, to a fixed standpoint within tradition. All subjects inhabit a fixed standpoint, and it is
this fixedness that constrains the subject's understanding within a similarly fixed range of vision,
due to the prejudices that such a standpoint provides us with.48 There is a demarcation between
the things the subject understands well, and the things it is less familiar with. The figurative
"distance" between the subject and the limit of their understanding-i.e. the barrier between the
familiar and the alien-is what Gadamer deems a "horizon". As he writes, "The horizon is the
range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point.,,49 With
regard to human understanding, a horizon is the field of view in which the subject can regard the
things it knows in relation to itself, and distinguish these from the things it does not know. In this
47 Gadamer, TM,106.
48 Gadamer,TM,302.
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sense, the quantity of things known, and the degree to which those things are known, either limit
or expand the subject's horizon, with greater quantities and degrees of understanding making the
horizon wider. This gives horizons a malleable character, because they expand with a fluctuating
degree of regularity, depending on how far the subject ventures into the unfamiliar. In this
expansion, the breadth of the subject's horizon conditions the significance of those things they
understand, because the more complete the subject's understanding of something is, the more
that thing is pulled away from the edge of the horizon (the boundary between the familiar and
unfamiliar) to the subject. As the subject's understanding of things increases, the ensuing growth
of the subject's horizon positions these things in such a manner that the subject is prevented from
distorting the things' significance. This is because the greater the horizon, the clearer the
subject's vision of things outside the subject becomes. The subject is " ... not limited to what is
nearby but. .. able to see beyond it."sO As the interpreting subject learns more about the
phenomenon they are confronted with, they gain a clearer perception of the phenomenon's
relations to other phenomena. This clarity diminishes the effect of the subject's prejudices on the
object, allowing the object to retain its objectivity outside of the assumed significance that the
subject ascribes to it. In gaining this kind of knowledge, the subject begins to see an object's
significance not in relation to their subjective situation, but in relation to the larger context
provided by the object's historicity. In this sense, the concept of the horizon is the foundation of
hermeneutic understanding. It serves as the cognitive framework within which human beings
understand phenomena, and it defines how this understanding enlarges our perceptive scope.
Gadamer's next task is to describe the behaviour of the horizon, and how it makes the
unknown knowable. To do this, he employs the concepts of "transposition" and "fusion" to
so Gadamer, TM,302.
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account for how this process works. The mechanics of transposition are analogous to the
dialectic model of inquiry from the preceding chapter, in that the subject's horizon comes into
contact with the horizons of other subjects, resulting in an exchange of understanding. Like a
conversation between two people, the overlap between the horizons facilitates a trade of
perspectives. The things known by one party are being received by the other, and if each party
comes to accept the other's interpretations of these things, but remains cognizant of the unique
angles by which the subjects approach each other, then transposition between them can be
maintained. 5I Gadamer points out that there is a weakness in this model, however. Unlike a true
conversation, transposition is not focused on agreement, but on simply determining the
viewpoint of the other. Thus, the subject's transposition into what is alien merely brings it into
contact with the unfamiliar without any need to place the subject's self-understanding in danger
of being challenged. 52 As a result, merely transposing oneself into the situation of the other
presents a barrier to understanding. One subject's desire to withhold their self-understanding
from the other only serves to reinforce the prejudices of both subjects. As Gadamer states:
Transposing ourselves consists neither in the empathy of one individual for
another nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather, it
always involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own
particularity but also that of the other ...To acquire a horizon means that one
learns to look beyond what is close at hand-not in order to look away from it but
to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. 53
51 Gadamer, TM, 305.
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We can see elements of the dialectical mode of inquiry from Chapter I in this passage. Also, we
can see how it correlates with the concepts of Erfahrung, fusion, and play. With regard to
horizons, the function of question and answer that allows one subject to "read" the understanding
of the other is at work in transposition. But as Gadamer claims, the view of transposition as
"placing ourselves in the other situation" can result in refusing to revise our prejudices regarding
the other, leading us to an interpretive stagnation. 54 Although subjects are initially confined to
regarding the other in light oftheir own prejudgments, transposition does not invite the subject to
critically assess this starting point. There is a balance needed here, in order for transposition to be
compatible with the dialogical movement of play. The subject must acknowledge to what extent
their horizon is conditioned by their prejudices, and in doing so interpret the other as something
familiar. How can this be achieved without the complete dissolution of the subject into the
objective whole, or the subject's refusal to moderate their fore-conception of reality?
Gadamer's response is to redefine the subject-object model of dialogical understanding.
For him, the process of transposition cannot simply be Subject A sharing its understanding with
Subject B. This would involve each subject reducing the other to an object of understanding,
leading to the overemphasis on subjectivity shown above. Instead, it is thejUsion ofhorizons that
allows for the acquisition of knowledge from another horizon, and this newly-acquired
knowledge does not simply maintain the size of the receiving subject's horizon, but enlarges it.
Fusion is the ultimate result of mediation between the subject and the various historical contexts
of what it encounters, and these contexts are what actually allow understanding to take place. 55
Both subject and object are embedded in history, and the subject's awareness of this history-its
"historical consciousness"-is what keeps them from distorting the significance of what they
54 Gadamer,TM,303-30S.
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come to understand. It is the subject's ability to relate these contexts to their own experience that
allows truth to be revealed, and there is no historical context that cannot relate in some way to
our present understanding of the world. Fusion occurs when we bring our horizon into contact
with the greater horizon of history and allow it to inform us about that which is unfamiliar. The
universality of history provides human understanding with the "rules of the game", so to speak,
and lets it act as an objective referee, one that makes the rules intelligible to the players, and
applicable to their situation. And as historical consciousness allows the subject to fuse their
horizon with the grander horizon of history, their horizon is filled by the contexts history
provides, increasing their understanding of the world and expanding their horizon accordingly.56
II. The Primacy of the Play-Structure
Just as history allows for new understandings through fusion, the spontaneity of
discovery found in play comes as a result of the rules imposed on the players. In the same way
that plasma allows individu~l blood cells to move freely through capillaries, interpreting subjects
are similarly nourished and given mobility by the historicity that defines both them and the
things around them. Subjects check and validate their prejudices in light of history's authority
and allow this authority to reveal more clearly the relationships between things in the world. But
the nature of fusion, through its "raising up" of subjectivity into the grander sphere of historical
tradition, does pose a resemblance to Erlebnis and thus does not sound compatible with
Erfahrung. To avoid this incongruence, Gadamer makes a number of statements that reinforce
the connection between horizons and Erfahrung, by linking both more directly with the nature of
play:
56 Gadamer,TM,304.
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The particular nature of a game lies in the rules and regulations that prescribe the
way the field of the game is filled. The playing field on which the game is played
is ... defined far more by the structure that determines the movement of the game
from within than by what it comes up against-i.e., the boundaries of the open
space-limiting movement from without. 57
We can see how this statement is aligned with Erfahrung by examining how play and
transposition are incompatible with Erlebnis. In the section on horizons, Gadamer appears to
indicate a correlation between Erlebnis and the "rising to a higher universality" suggested by
fusion. It seems that both concepts appeal to the same idea; a mode of experience that is lifted
out of the continuity that Erfahrung represents. In order to denounce that this is the case, we
must ask: what is it that distinguishes Erlebnis from fusion? The answer is that the fusion of
horizons never involves a departure from Erfahrung; it constitutes the acquisition of new
understandings, and the overturning of prejudices, but always from within the continuity of
human experience. The "higher universality" that comes as a result of fusion is not a lifting-out-
of, but an acquiring-from-within. Our willingness to submit our prejudices before the judgment
seat of history in order to understand the unfamiliar does indeed suggest a shift in focus.
However, our embeddedness within the very history we tum to proves that this consultation is
not an experience removed from Erfahrung, but a dialogue that occurs within it. Likewise, the
play-experience also involves a dialogical approach to self-understanding, which situates play
within the continuity of Elfahrung, but at the same time granting it a distinction from other
modes of behaviour.
57 Gadamer, TM,107.
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As shown in the above quotation, Gadamer discusses the establishing of a perimeter
around the play-area to demarcate the space in which the rules of the game apply from the
space(s) where they do not. This demarcation is necessary because a game contains a set of rules
unique to itself, in that they set before the players a series of tasks that need to be achieved in
order for the play-experience to manifest in reality. These tasks are not intended for any purpose
other than the manifestation of the game; they redirect the subject's energies from the
interactions that characterize ongoing, everyday activity, to a set of interactions confined to the
rules of the game. 58 In this way, the purposiveness that guides everyday activity is being
sublimated in favour of the goals set by the game's rules. The separation of the play-space from
all others is therefore a necessary process in order for a play-experience to take place within it.
But if the significance of that space is defined exclusively by its demarcation alone, and not by
the structure of the game that is played there, then the space gains special significance, with or
without a game playing itself out within that space. Taking the space to be significant in itself,
without understanding why it is unique, is to foster a prejudice regarding it: that any uniquely
demarcated space is elevated above the flow of ordinary human existence, regardless of what
actually takes place there. This is a direct example ofErlebnis, and we can see how it reinforces
aesthetic differentiation. An audience that ascribes a special significance to an art gallery does so
because they view art galleries as distinctly "aesthetic" spaces and therefore deprive the artworks
they contain from making claims about reality. The audience's preconception of what an art
gallery is overrides how they interact with the artworks within it, and the self-understanding they
receive from the artworks will be likewise distorted. This is because nothing is being done to
challenge the audience's prejudices, a task that would otherwise fall to the works in the gallery.
Automatically inflating the significance of the gallery space places an interpretive barrier
58 Gadamer,TM,107-108.
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between the artworks and the truth they can give to the subject. Therefore, it cannot be the space
marked out for play, but the structure of play-as expressed by the tasks it sets before us, and as
presented by the players involved-that allows for the assessment of our prejudices and permits
the growth of our horizons. This process demands a de-subjectification; a submission to the play-
experience an artwork sets before us, rather than a projection of our own prejudices upon it. We
must still regard play-experiences as having a self-contained purposiveness, but this does not
have to demand isolating the meaning they provide from every other meaning, and thus from
every other experience.
If the space carved out for a play-experience is defined by its structure, we must discover
how human beings enter into this structure, and the implications this has for aesthetic
consciousness. Essential to the structure of play is the involvement of human reason, which sets
the rules that confine the activity of play within the play-experience and maintains the play-
experience's non-purposive nature. 59 Just as the transposition of the subject's horizon is a
conscious undertaking, play is similarly fuelled by the subject's conscious awareness of their
environment. This is what Gadamer takes to be the distinction between human play and the play
found in nature: unlike nature, human beings have the capacity to "choose" to enter into a
game.60 The human desire to play suggests that play is something other than the kinds of
activities we typically engage in. Gadamer summarizes this distinction by alluding to the
transformed emotional state the player undergoes:
The ease ofplay-which ... refers phenomenologically only to the absence of
strain-is experienced subjectively as relaxation. The structure of play absorbs
59Gadamer,RB, 23.
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the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative,
which constitutes the actual strain ofexistence.61
The separation between play and non-play consists in the alleviation of this strain, and this
alleviation comes as a result of the subject's willingness to yield to the other, and relinquish the
sovereignty of their prejudices. We have seen how this yielding plays out with regard to the
fusion of horizons, but with regard to play, the existence of the rule-set that confines behaviour
within the play-experience is essential to making this yielding possible. We can refer to the rule-
set of a play-experience as the "play-structure". Without an external play-structure governing the
subject's behaviour, the subject must rely on their own foreknowledge to make sense of the
present, inhibiting their perception of its relation to the past. This is also the point on which
Gadamer agrees with Johann Huizinga; play resides outside the domain of "practical life", in
that, as stated previously, its intended aim manifests as a set of tasks within itself.62 Thus, play-
structures must always contrast against a subject's prejudices in order to be regarded as the rules
of play, because it is the subject's prejudices that the play-structure seeks to overthrow. But
herein lies the crucial point: the process of questioning and validating our prejudices, so as to
clarify the things we seek to understand, has the character of a play-experience itself; in fact, this
process is what defines every play-experience. Moreover, this means that a play-structure is what
allows for this questioning process to take place. This is the fundamental reason why a play-
experience cannot be a moment of Erlebnis; its very existence as a play-experience depends on
the relation of its structure to every other human experience. The subject's decision to become a
player, and to enter into play, is conditioned by the prejudices and events that lead to them
making that decision. Therefore, the self-understanding gained through the play-experience is
61 Gadamer, TM,105.
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also product of these prior moments, making its play-structure directly responsible for shaping
our understanding. From this, we discover that the dialectic of inquiry, play, and the fusion of
horizons all form the essence of the hermeneutic experience, in that each represents the
interconnectedness of Erfahrung. All three share the same model of dialogical encounter,
because each involves the subject questioning their fore-conception of reality, and gaining a
clearer historical understanding of their relation to the world.
III. The Presentation-Manifestion of Art and Mimesis
Our examination must now carry these concepts into a more deeply aesthetic direction.
Gadamer believes that play characterizes the truth of an artwork, and that this experience does
not support the thesis of aesthetic consciousness. The indictment of Erlebnis at the heart of this
argument makes Gadamer's position logical. But in what way does an artwork possess the kind
of play-structure needed to reduce the audience's subjectivity, in the same way that play has
primacy over the player? Also, does it possess both this structure and the identity of another
"player", with whom the audience engages? Answering these questions will demand an
assessment of what Gadamer believes is unique to the ontology of artworks and how the earlier
analysis of horizons and Erfahrung feeds into the dialogue between art and audience.
Unlike other forms of play, such as the play of waves or light, an artwork acquires a kind
of material permanence that allows it to stand as a testament to the play-structure it is made to
represent. What makes this quality particularly unique and distinguishes art from games or other
forms of human play is the autonomy of this representation. As a self-contained material object,
an artwork is able to persistently and immediately present its play-structure with a level of
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sustainable permanence not found in games or sportS.63 In those kinds of play, the players, as
rational human beings, choose to enter into the game. But art never has to make this choice. It
presents its structure through its physical and historical horizons, and it is this fusion of its
historical horizons that stands in place of the interchangeable human players who would
otherwise present its play-structure. It stands as the presentation-manifestation, an individual
entity that, provided all of the parts of its arrangement remain intact, consistently presents it
play-structure to a receiving audience. An artwork's horizons coalesce with its play-structure,
resulting in the artwork manifesting not only as a physical object, but undergoing a
"transformation into structure" (Verwandlung ins Gebielde), which is the status an object
acquires when its presentation of play-structure acquires an ontological consistence. 64 Unlike a
game, the self-understanding provided by an artwork's play-structure is not dependent on
someone encountering it in a certain moment. Its "self-presentation" persists regardless of who is
there to receive it; it becomes like an eternal wellspring of truth, one that can always be counted
on to provide self-understanding, regardless of whether the audience is there to receive it. This
self-presentation is what allows an artwork to engage its audience in a play-experience.
To explore the idea of self-presentation further, Gadamer's concepts of presentation
(Darstellung) and representation (Darstellungfur jemanden) need to be delineated more closely.
We have established that the nature of play is fully realized when a group of players submits
their purposive will to a game's structure (or "play-structure"), and then presents this structure
by co-coordinating their movements to the rules it provides. These movements are what
constitute the presentation (Darstellung) of the play-experience. Similarly, an artwork possesses
63 Gianni Vattimo, Art's Claim to Truth, ed. Santiago Zabala, trans. Luca D'isanto, (New York: Columbia University
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this same ability, in that it presents the audience with a play-structure that challenges their
preconceptions and foreknowledge. This is what makes the interpretation of art analogous with
the fusion of horizons. The various contexts that define the artwork's ontological makeup are
what constitute this analogy, because they stimulate the use of the audience's historical
consciousness in order for the audience to experience self-understanding through them. But in
the case of artworks, this self-understanding is received through representation, and this is where
Gadamer attributes representation to the Greek concept of imitation (mimesis):
Imitation, as representation, has a special cognitive function. For this reason, the
concept of imitation sufficed for the theory of art as long as the cognitive
significance of art went unquestioned.65
Gadamer draws on Platonic essentialism here, in order to illustrate how artworks embody their
presentation. Plato ranks objects of mimesis (i.e. artworks) beneath the physical things they are a
likeness of, because for him, physical objects are imperfect imitations of the Forms, and as
"imitations of imitations", objects of mimesis represent the Forms even less perfectly than the
things they are made to resemble. However, understanding what a mimesis represents still
involves an act of recognizing its presentation, and this act is what allows a presentation to be
received as a representation.66 For a subject to recognize something means they have acquired a
degree of knowledge regarding the essence of what it represents, and if the artwork's essential
character is that of the play-experience it presents, then the representation of that play-experience
is equally essential to the artwork. We can see a problem emerging here: in order for recognition
to occur, the subject must possess prior knowledge of the thing an artwork represents, so that the
65Gadamer,TM,115.
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artwork's play-structure will be made clear. This makes it appear that the audience's subjective
knowledge is still needed to understand an artwork's truth. Does this suggest that artistic
interpretation is not merely the passive reception of truth? Moreover, does this mean subjectivity
is at least partly responsible for defining the truth of an artwork?
Gadamer dissolves these concerns with the concept of Erfahrung. It is true that the self-
understanding received from an artwork will manifest differently for every subject who
encounters it, and that a multiplicity of interpretations will emerge from these various subjects.
However, the memories that constitute the fore-knowledge-and therefore, the prejudices-of
every subject are still determined by their embeddedness within the objective pantheon of
history. Ifwe ascribe objective reality to the things that happen over the course of a person's life,
and state that these things are what constitute their human experience as Erfahrung, then their
subjective recognition of what an artwork's mimesis represents is similarly conditioned by
objective reality. As well, the ontological finitude of both artwork and subject embeds both
within the same historical tradition, providing both with a definable point of origin, allowing us
to make objectively credible claims about how the artwork presents its play-structure, and how
the subject receives its representation. This means that in order for the subject to fuse their
horizon with the historical horizons of the artwork, they must submit themselves to the play-
structure that lies within the artwork and allow this structure to provide them with the
"knowledge of the presentation"-the representation-that defines the artwork's essence. It is
this knowledge that will allow the subject to question the artwork's representation, leading them
to discover the self-understanding it provides them with.
Thus, the truth of an artwork is not revealed when the subject arbitrarily imposes their
self-understanding on an object to see how closely they can make the work fall in line with how
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they perceive themselves. Instead, this truth is what the subject receives when they inquire as to
what the artwork represents and allow the artwork to reveal this to them. From this, we can
define representation as the received form of presentation. It is, as the phrase Darstellungfur
jemanden suggests, a "presentation for someone", in that it is what an audience receives from
witnessing a play-experience and allowing itself to be caught up in play.67 The audience is thus
brought into the play-experience the artwork represents, because they recognize how the play-
structure and fusion of horizons within this representation relate to other experiences they have
had. But what is essential is that the subject remains aware that these prior experiences are what
constitute their prejudices; therefore the subject must remain open to allowing the truth revealed
to revise their prejudices. Only through this process of revision, Gadamer believes, can true
understanding occur.
We can immediately see how this process clashes with aesthetic differentiation. As
shown above, the recognition of an artwork removes the fourth wall between artwork and
audience, and accommodates the inter-subjective nature of interpretation. But most importantly,
it acknowledges that art is knowledge, because to interpret it is to understand it in relation to
other things that can be known, allowing the event of interpreting it to condition, and be
conditioned by, everything else we experience.68 Aesthetic differentiation, on the other hand,
does something quite different. As a process grounded in Erlebnis, aesthetic differentiation
ignores the importance of the artwork's historical horizons entirely, because it is only in the
single experience of encounter with the artwork as a pure, isolated entity that meaning is
revealed. And this meaning is never objectively verified in light of what history tells the subject;
thus the aesthetic experience under Erlebnis does not involve the fusion of horizons at all,
: Gadamer,TM, 117.
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because the audience is deprived of their ability to juxtapose their prejudices against the
artwork's historical and ontological horizons. Because the artwork's representation is so
abstracted from its situatedness in history, it is similarly kept from providing the audience with
the play-structure it contains, which would otherwise allow for the audience to understand the
truth provided by the artwork. The outcome of aesthetic consciousness is that it prevents
artworks from expanding a subject's horizon. And since this lack of growth causes the subject to
over-value the things they are familiar with, they end up ascribing a distortedly high significance
to them. Hence, the prejudices that maintain the subject's fore-conception of reality are not being
adequately challenged or assessed, but are instead taken for granted. But as Gadamer makes
clear, "interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones.,,69 We
cannot say, from Gadamer's perspective, that an audience has "interpreted" an artwork unless the
dialogue of question and answer takes place between them both, and succeeds in expanding the
audience's horizon with each successive encounter they have with the work. And because this
dialogue takes on the form of a play-experience-provided by the artwork representing its play-
structure, through its manifestation of horizons-to ignore these horizons is to ignore the
dialogue that the work is attempting to engage us in.
69 Gadamer, TM,267.
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Chapter 3: The Language and Temporality of Play through Symbol and
Festival
I. Language, Play, and the Hermeneutic Circle
We have seen how the play-experience makes itself known through art, by means of the
subject's recognition of what an artwork represents. However, merely acknowledging that this
process of recognition belongs to Erfahrung, given its relation to the fusion of horizons, will not
suffice to explain it fully. What remains to be understood are the mechanics that stand behind
this process. As we venture towards understanding these mechanics, we find ourselves
confronted by some preliminary questions. How is it that an artwork's play-structure and
historical horizons are recognized as a representation? Is there a correlation between what an
artwork communicates and language in general? Also, if the aesthetic experience is characterized
as a play-experience, as Gadamer claims, how does the aesthetic experience similarly distinguish
itself from other experiences, without elevating it to the level of Erlebnis? Gadamer employs the
concepts of "symbol" and "festival" to mitigate these concerns. In doing so, he demonstrates
how aesthetic consciousness impedes the freedom of expression that language provides, and
becomes a barrier to the hermeneutic nature of understanding.
To fully explain how an artwork communicates itself, we must turn to Gadamer's larger
argument regarding language, and link it to the concept of the play-experience we have been
concerned with thus far. At the crux of this larger argument is Gadamer's division between the
concepts of "world" and "environment", and the role that language plays in this division. For
him, humanity's capacity for language is what makes the species so unique; it is language that
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reveals humanity's freedom from its natural environment, and conversely it is this freedom that
makes language itselfpossible.7o
To have a world means to have an orientation (Verhalten) toward it. To have an
orientation toward the world ... means to keep oneself so free from what one
encounters of the world that one can present it to oneself as it is. This capacity is
at once to have a world and to have language. The concept of world is thus
opposed to the concept of environment, which all living beings in the world
possess. 71
Nested within this passage are shadows of the concepts we have just explored. First, the concept
of "orientation" and the presentation of a thing "as it is" to the self are directly congruent with
the fusion of horizons. The subject's orientation, in this case, refers to how the subject is situated
within the horizon of history, its situation within the historical tradition to which it is resigned.
By the same token, the phrase "what one encounters of the world" is synonymous with the things
within the subject's horizon, and their presentation "as they are" refers to the degree to which
they are objectively understood. It is the "freedom from" these things, however, that provides the
most tangible link between play and language. Gadamer's wording is specific for a reason here:
to be free from something is to withhold one's subjectivity and allow the object to present itself
to them as it is. In keeping with what was discussed about prejudices, it is when the subject
acknowledges their prejudices, and assesses their validity in light of the thing being experienced,
that the truth of the thing's nature is more fully revealed to the subject. This means that the
human being has risen above its environment, because they are no longer strictly dependent on
70 Gadamer, TM,444.
71 Gadamer, TM,443.
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their environment to provide them with understanding-in other words, they no longer operate
on the same level as an animal. Gadamer believes animals lack the ability to conceive of their
environment in any context other than their own, subjective viewpoint. 72 The capacity for
language is what affords humanity the ability to rise above environment in this way; to acquire
knowledge of how they are situated in their environment, and what the implications of this
situatedness are. The human subject acquires this knowledge when they are able to express what
they experience through language. As a result, "the verbal world in which we live is not a barrier
that prevents knowledge ... but fundamentally embraces everything in which our insight can be
enlarged and deepened.,,73 Rising above our environment lets us regard it as a "world", and this
viewpoint lets us more clearly perceive the inter-subjective relationships that populate it.
However, this rising-above should not be confused with the rising-out-ofthat
characterizes Erlebnis. The concept of world does not demand that we become removed from
our experience within a physical environment, nor does having a world provide the subject with
infinite knowledge; rather, it means that we acquire another "posture" towards it.74 Because the
subject is still situated within the horizon of history, they do not leave the domain ofErfahrung.
This situatedness demands that the subject comes to understand their situation, and in turn this
demands an understanding of those things outside the subject. This "coming to an
understanding" is what comes as a result of language, and it highlights not only the relation of
language to play, but its disruption of the traditional subject-object model of understanding.
Language has its true being only in dialogue, in coming to an understanding. This
is not to be understood as if that were the purpose oflanguage..For language is by
72 Gadamer, TM,445.
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nature the language of conversation; it fully realizes itself only in the process of
coming to an understanding. That is why it is not a mere means in that process. 75
Much like the play-experience, the human use of language is not centered on coming to an
understanding as an ultimate "goal". A true conversation does not simply cease to play itself out
once the speakers receive the knowledge they were looking for. This kind of dialogue would
possess the nature of basic transposition, with both parties acquiring knowledge of each other
from within the confines of their own prejudices, neither making an attempt to surprise the other
and learn something new. It would also carry a markedly Hegelian flavour, wherein the
conversation would flow to a dead end once the speakers' expectations for knowledge are
satisfied. Ifwe are to agree with Gadamer, and take the conversation between two people as a
conversation taking place within Erfahrung, then the conversation itself must be a phenomenon
ofErfahrung. This is why the disclosure of "world" is so vital to human language for
Gadamer-it is the disclosure of "world" that allows two people to discuss a thing that both have
experienced, from different perspectives. This combination, of two different perspectives on the
one hand, and their unity with a common subject matter on the other, is what makes a
conversation an aspect of Erfahrung. The unknown element that the other represents is overcome
by the sharing of interpretations regarding as aspect of the world, an aspect that both can
articulate and respond to through language. In this way, " ... language is a medium where I and
world meet or, rather, manifest their original belonging together. .. .Being that can be understood
is language.,,76 The human capacity to rise above environment and understand the world not only
makes language possible, but allows us to share information about what belongs to experience.
World is not some abstracted, ideal world-in-itselfthat remains divorced from material existence,
75 Gadamer,TM,446.
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for such a view of the world would lie beyond language and thus remain unintelligible; rather,
world is how we perceive our environment when we attempt to understand the inter-subjective
relationships that take place within it.
The concept of world is, as Gadamer claims, " .. the common ground, trodden by none
and recognized by all, uniting all who talk to one another."n In the same way that a demarcated
play-space still rests within an environment, but achieves a distinction from it because of the
non-purposive nature of what takes place within the space, the world also denotes a kind of play-
space, in which a network of hermeneutic exchanges can play itself out. What kind of play-
experience occurs within the play-space of the world? We can turn to the fusion of horizons for
the answer. Gadamer makes it clear that "coming to an understanding" means to engage with the
other in such a way that our prejudices regarding it are assessed and revised. In order for this
revision process to take place, an act of recognition must be made between the subject and the
object of perception they are trying to understand. This recognition hinges on the subject matter
of the dialogue that both subject and object are engaged in, and it is the influence of the subject's
fore-conception that helps them recognize the subject matter that determines to what extent the
subject understands the object they are confronted with. Much like the agony of seeing, the
degree to which the subject matter of a dialogue is recognized will inform the subject as to how
much revision their prejudices must endure, in order to reach an understanding of the present
object. In addition, the influence of subject matter on human understanding means that the
dialogue concerns an actual entity, situated within the flow of tradition, allowing the subject to
regard the object as situated within the same, objective reality as both themselves and the subject
matter. The subject is able to fuse their horizon with that which is other, because they allow their
77 Gadamer,TM,446.
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recognition of the subject matter that concerns the two of them to bridge the gulfof
understanding between them. The statement made earlier, that the fusion of horizons is a play-
experience, appears clearer now. But what is the element that provides play-structure for this
kind of dialogical exchange? The answer is language. Language establishes the rules of the
exchange, which makes the parties involved players in the game of dialogue. Subject and object
are no longer subordinate to one another; they are equally subordinate to the language that allows
the subject to recognize the other, through the recognition of their shared subject matter. An
appropriate model for this kind of exchange would be a sport, like soccer. Language acts as the
rules of the game, the subject and object become players, the subject matter is the ball, and the
world is the playing field. The players respond to the ball with moves and countermoves,
anticipating each movement and responding accordingly, within the consistent framework
established by the rules. So it is with the relation of language to understanding; over the course
of a conversation, both speakers discuss a topic they recognize, within the structure established
by language, playing through the to-and-fro movement of speaker and listener with each
response one of them makes. And the conversation takes place within the world that the parties
have been cognitively raised to, so that their use of language can occur.
This behaviour, of anticipating a movement while staying mindful of that movement's
relation to a larger process, directly corresponds to the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer states this
case rather clearly:
The circle.. is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the
interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The
anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding... proceeds from the
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commonality that binds us to tradition. But this commonality is constantly being
formed in our relation to tradition.78
Just as a play-experience, as a unified, singular phenomena, comes into being through the
presentation of its many parts, so too does understanding operate under a similar tension between
a complete concept and its constituent facets. As human beings, it is our nature to understand
things as wholes. This is what Gadamer refers to as the "fore-conception of completeness",
which means that we always expect the phenomena we encounter to have relationships with
other phenomena. In tum, these relationships are what allow us to perceive the phenomena as
conceptual "building blocks", and understand how the arrangement of them makes the concept
they represent possible. Gadamer uses the example of written texts to account for this
behaviour-we always assume the completeness of a text before we begin to explore the parts
that comprise it, and this assumption is based on the specific content that the text concerns. 79
Texts are understood not on the basis of isolated words or sentences, but on the relations between
those words or sentences that constitute a unity of meaning, a unity that the book is taken to
represent as a completed whole. This unity provides the interpreter with the content of the book,
and to understand this content means that they have acknowledged the truth of their orientation
towards it. We must expand on this point further. In the case of texts as unities of meaning, the
reader approaches texts with prejudices in tow. They do not believe their prejudices to be true in
themselves, but acknowledge that they are prejudices genuinely carried and actually possessed-
their existence is, in a word, true. It is with this acknowledgment of one's prejudices that the
reader can begin to make judgments about what they read, to see how closely the subject matter
of the text aligns with their prejudices. This is how the reader leverages their fore-conception of
78 Gadamer, TM,293.
79 Gadamer,TM,294.
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reality to access the unity of meaning found in the text; by drawing on their experience of reality
to bring the unfamiliar aspects ofa text within their horizon of understanding. Gadamer's use of
the word lesen in the original German is illuminating in this regard. Used in the context of
"reading", lesen carries a connotative richness in German that does not translate smoothly into
English. It is not only reading in the sense of receiving a transmission of content, but as an active
gathering and harvesting of meaning. 80 It involves the recollecting of what the subject already
knows, which allows for the collecting of what new thing the subject is confronted with. The
things recognized in the text are what allow the reader to gain access to the things unfamiliar to
them. Both categories of things are gathered together, and this gathering of what came before
and what currently confronts the reader is what allows them to recognize the text's unity of
meaning. Thus, the subject matter (i.e., content) that links the subject to the object it seeks to
understand is what makes understanding possible, and allows the fusion of horizons-as the
"play-experience of understanding"-to occur. The dialogue of question and answer between
subject and subject matter is what allows our horizon to fuse with history, and our capacity for
language is what allows for us to adequately define how we are situated in relation to history,
making our fusion with it possible. Language serves as the play-structure that underlies the
fusion of horizons, and makes possible the recognition of the commonality between those
horizons.
II. Symbol's Relation to Play through Art
Now that the relation of language to play has been delineated, the aesthetic implications
of language as play-structure begin to emerge. How do artworks make use of language in this
80 Jean Grondin, "Gadamer's Aesthetics: The Overcoming of Aesthetic Consciousness and the Hermeneutical Truth
of Art," in The Encyclopedia atAesthetics (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, Vol. 2, 1998),7.
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way, when they already represent their play-structure by virtue of their ontological existence?
Gadamer invokes the concept of the symbol to account for an artwork's use oflanguage. For
hjm, a symbol-in general, i.e., not specific to symbolism in artworks, is a sensible object that
stands in place of a non-sensible concept, giving the concept a tangible point of contact for an
interpreting subject. Gadamer is invoking the Greek meaning of symbolon here; a token of
remembrance, made from a medallion split in two, which is used to help remind the bearer of
their relationship to another family. The intangibility of the relationship is made recognizable
through the symbolon, so that the bearer of one half can be mindful of the bond they share with
an entity that is not present; in this case, the other family.81 This element, of recognition through
the material substitution of that which is not present, effectively describes the basic function of
the symbol. We can also see that, given the intrinsic connection between recognition and
representation, the symbol makes recognition possible through its representation in a similar
manner to an artwork. It is a unique fusion of language and subject matter that strongly
resembles the presentation-manifest of art. First, it represents itself based on how it substitutes
for an object of understanding, i.e., its subject matter. This representation must involve the
intentional use of language, because the subject's knowledge of this language will allow them to
recognize the object of the symbol's representation. The symbol takes on the character of an
articulated-and thus, intelligible-statement that can make itself known to the subject, and thus
communicate what it is intended to represent. Secondly, the subject recognizes the symbol's
meaning because of its relation to the subject's Erfahrung, providing the subject with the fore-
conceptual framework needed to recognize how the symbol's representation is situated within
Erfahrung.
81Gadamer,RB,31.
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However, a symbol alone, such as a badge, medallion, or religious token, should not be
conflated with an artwork. The reason for this is that an object that exists strictly as a symbol of
something else has a purposiveness outside itself, something that is incompatible with the play-
experience an artwork provides. To this end, Gadamer claims that not all representations are
necessarily representations of art, because to indicate the existence of something outside oneself
is not strictly the character of an artwork. 82 The element of self-understanding, and the truth it
provides, is missing from the equation proposed by the symbol. Gadamer believes that a mere
gesture towards something that is not present is the character of two modes of symbolic
representation, neither of which is analogous with the presentation-manifest of art. He uses the
example of the picture to illustrate this:
The essence of a picture is situated .. between two extremes: these extremes of
representation are pure indication, which is the essence of the sign, and pure
substitution, which is the essence of the symbol. There is something of both in a
picture.83
According to Gadamer, a sign's ontological significance is dominated by that which it
represents, to the extent that its representation gains no autonomy. Unlike an artwork, the
multiplicity of audience interpretations is absent here. Its ftmction is to point away from itself,
and its representation is forever chained to the aspect of tradition--of the past-that it is meant
to indicate.84 It is through their connection to the past that an object serving as a sign can be
elevated to the status ofa memento, in that their presence awakens our memories of the events
they represent, linking us more closely with the horizon of history. But even in this case, the
8'Gadamer, TM,151.
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sign's significance is contingent on whoever experienced the event that the memento refers to.
As a result, even a memento can cease to act as a sign, if enough people forget the subject matter
it represents. What is unique to an artwork, however, is that it does not point away from itself,
but towards the content it itself expresses. The artwork signifies nothing other than itself, giving
it what Gadamer calls an "ontological valence"; a hermeneutic depth that demands we linger
over it, partaking in the agony of seeing until self-understanding is reached.8s The use of
"valence" in this case suggests a level of attractiveness contained in the artwork; that in its self-
contained representation, it is inviting us to submit to the play-experience it presents us with, and
enter into the event of meaning it provides.
With regard to the symbol, Gadamer believes that an artwork has more in common with it
than a sign, but that it still falls short of the unique blend of both that is proper to an artwork.86
Nevertheless, the symbol can still take the place of what it represents, and present the meaning of
this representation with just as much ontological potency as the original thing it represents.
However, what is lacking from the symbol is its ability to make a claim regarding its
representation. This line of thinking goes back to what was said earlier, about art making a claim
about us, as subjects, and inviting us to question what it has to say. This is not only what
separates symbols from artworks; it demonstrates an artwork's use oflanguage. The artwork
possesses the standing-in-for of the symbol, in order to represent its content through its
ontological presence. But unlike the symbol, an artwork's meaning is not bound to the content its
representation stands in place of; this would significantly limit the number and variety of
interpretations one could have of it, and would also limit its ontological valence. In order for the
self-understanding that the audience receives from it to be different for each subject-by virtue
85 Gadamer, TM,153.
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of its ontological valence-the artwork must not be regarded as the product of its representation,
but as that which defies any attempt to constrain its meaning in this way. Gadamer refers to this
constraining ofa symbol's meaning as the symbol's "institution".
By "institution" we mean the origin of something's being taken as a sign or
functioning symbolically. In this fundamental sense, even so-called "natural"
signs-e.g., all the indications and presages of an event of nature-are
instituted... This is also true of all artificial signs. Here the sign is established by
convention, and the originating act by which it is established is called its
"institution.,,87
An object taken to be strictly a symbol has an exhaustible meaning. By having a definable event
of institution, the symbol's meaning is constrained to very particular content, making its
representation for each subject manifest with a greater degree of uniformity in each case. The
commonality that is given to the subject through the symbol's subject matter is reduced in scope,
to the extent that the symbol no longer represents a set of things both familiar and unfamiliar to
the subject. As we saw with the hermeneutic circle, both the known and the alien must be taken
together in order to reach new understanding. But in the case of that which is strictly a symbol,
such as a badge or a monument, only the familiar content is "read" by the subject, because a
badge or monument has had its content instituted, in order to make it symbolic of something.
Thus, in contrast to an artwork, the manners in which the subjects recognize a symbol's
representation will bear a closer congruency with each other, meaning that a smaller range of
understandings emerges between the subjects. In this way, the act of institution bears the mark of
Erlebnis, because it is attempting to limit the symbolic scope of the object to a particular subject
87 Gadamer, TM,155.
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matter, and thus impose a cap on the number of interpretations one can have of it. This
imposition is the result of what Gadamer referred to above as "pure substitution"; Er/ebnis
presupposes that complete understanding of the symbol can be gleaned from a single encounter,
because only one, "correct" meaning can be gleaned form it. But unlike the symbol, an artwork
is able to resist any attempt we make at instituting its symbolic content. 88 The artwork's use of
symbolism is not tied down to any purpose other than the artwork's presentation-manifest,
allowing its content to remain within the context of Erfahrung, and not be encumbered by the
constraints ofEr/ebnis.
Despite art's freedom from institution, it should still be regarded as the product of
intention. Gadamer states that "the symbolic in general, and especially the symbolic in art . .is no
mere bearer of meaning-as if the meaning could be transferred to another bearer.,,89 The
meaning that an artwork possesses is fixed within the artwork, as an ontologically complete (but
not hermeneutically exhaustible) entity. However, the meaning it shelters within itself is by no
means an accidental meaning. An artwork is still an ordered arrangement, a creation made
according to an artist's intention. Ifwe are to escape the view that the artworks are empty vessels
waiting to be filled by the subject's understanding, it helps us to recognize artworks as
possessing more of an allegorical character than a symbolic one. An example of what Gadamer
means by allegory would include something like the Narnia books, in which religious concepts
are illustrated through metaphor, to demonstrate their use in an identifiable way. Whereas the
symbol is the coincidence of the sensible and non-sensible, allegory is the meaningful, intended
relation of the sensible to the non-sensible.9o With what has been said regarding recognition, we
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can see why allegory is a more attractive model for aesthetics under this system. The subject
matter of an allegorical work is directly linked to Erfahrung, in that the reader's understanding of
it is based not exclusively on an instituted meaning, but on things and events that the reader has
discovered in their own experience. The writer of an allegory uses symbolism to communicate a
particular set of ideas, in that the symbols used will allow the ideas they represent to be
recognized by the audience. The act of substitution that is unique to the symbol is being
leveraged by the artist, to provide a tangible starting point for the audience. What makes the
starting point tangible is its symbolic relation to each audience member's Erfahrung, and it is the
artist's task to craft the arrangement of these symbols so that the audience will recognize them as
elements ofErfahrung, allowing the audience to become lost in the work. Thus, the concept of
allegory is a direct parallel to the hermeneutic circle, because each recognition of an artwork's
symbols leads to a greater understanding of what the artwork has to say as a whole, complete
entity.
Aesthetic consciousness seeks to undermine this act of recognition. By asserting that art
has no actual relation to human experience, the cult of genius that dominated 19th century
aesthetics began to devalue allegory as a limited, old-fashioned use of symbolism. The fixed,
stable, intended nature of an allegory's meaning was seen by the Romanticists as grounded in
dogmatism. With Romanticism's radicalization of the Enlightenment's meta-prejudice, anything
concomitant with tradition was summarily dismissed, and this included the value of allegorical
works. The unconscious production of genius, as the new guiding aesthetic principle, demanded
that art employ a form of symbolic representation free from the underpinnings of tradition.9!
Taken this way, the symbol becomes the means by which the artist articulates the knowledge of
91 Gadamer, TM,79.
the infinite, which is the knowledge that Erlebnis seeks to provide. The artwork is no longer
making a claim about what the audience knows, granting them access to its historical horizons.
Instead, as having undergone aesthetic differentiation, the artwork is abstracted and removed
from the domain of Erfahrung, able to only symbolize an equally abstract, universal concept.
Since the aesthetic consciousness ... knows that it is free, the symbolism it imparts
to everything is also 'free.' However ambiguous and indeterminate the symbol
still remains ... it has its own positivity as a creation of the human mind. It is the
perfect consonance of appearance and idea which is now... emphasized in the
concept of symbol, whereas dissonance is reserved for allegory or mythical
consciousness.92
With this passage, Gadamer is illustrating the irony of using the symbol for the purpose of
Erlebnis. Without the foundation of history to give an artwork its connection with Erfahrung, the
symbolism it employs is limited in its representation. It cannot represent the truth of experience.
Instead, it is relegated to abstract universals, and therefore seduces the subject into the
interpretive laziness mentioned earlier. The subject ascribes to the artwork's symbolism
whatever abstract concept they believe it stands in for. As a concept so abstracted from the
artwork's content, it becomes incontestable, and ends the dialogue of question and answer.
This reveals the solipsistic aspect of aesthetic consciousness, and likewise, Erlebnis-to
give the subject complete, subjective, hermeneutic "freedom" over the artwork's content is to
prevent them from asking further questions of it. Just as it is impossible to credibly disprove the
validity of pure subjectivism, it is equally impossible to say that someone is wrong for believing
92 Gadamer, TM,80.
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that on first glance, a sculpture, such as Bernini's Apollo and Daphne, symbolizes the concept of
love's transformative power. The position of its two figures, without any other knowledge of the
sculpture's content, could certainly support this interpretation. But this claim, that a concept is
being symbolized, is nothing more than an abstraction of the sculpture's content. The story from
Ovid's Metamorphoses on which it is based, the life and personal history of Bernini, his source
of inspiration, how much he was paid for the sculpture, for whom it was sculpted for-these
aspects not only go unacknowledged through such an abstract claim, but its placation of our
initial, immediate interpretation of the world takes away even the need to consider them. And
yet, despite the attempt at ignoring these historical facets through aesthetic consciousness, they
are permanently enmeshed within the artwork's ontology, and thus, its representation is forever
conditioned by them, regardless of whether or not they are recognized. Moreover, because the
subject in question is satisfied with thinking that a universal concept is being represented, there is
no need for them to validate their assumptions. If they did, and investigated the background
details, they would have discovered the story in Metamorphoses that informs the sculpture and
seen the allusions to lust and virginity it contains. Knowledge of these allusions would take the
sculpture from being the symbol of some lofty, conceptual ideal to the domain of Erfahrung,
where experiences of lust and virginity possess actuality-things that human subjects have a
more tangible knowledge of, and that give the sculpture's symbolic content an allegorical
character. What this shows is that the freedom that the subject appears to gain through aesthetic
consciousness is not the freedom to understand, but the freedom to institute. They become the
arbiter of the artwork's symbolic content, dictating the nature of what is being represented, rather
than submitting to the claim the artwork already makes, about both the subject and the things
they have experienced over the course of their life. Due to this, the fusion of horizons that would
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occur between the subject and the sculpture is not able to take place, because the play-experience
that it provides the subject, through the reassessing of their prejudices, is not being performed.
This is why Gadamer says that an artwork is more than " ... a meaning that is experienced only in
an indeterminate way... The fact that it exists, its facticity, represents an insurmountable
resistance against any superior presumption that we can make sense of it all.,,93 It is this
resistance, and the subsequent need for successive encounters with an artwork, that the concept
offestival makes intelligible.
III. Festival and the Historically Affected Consciousness
Ifwe are to displace aesthetic consciousness, we must account for how an artwork
manages to retain its ontological completeness throughout time, without the raising of its
representation into the domain of infinite knowledge. To this end, we must examine the
temporality of an artwork, in both its persistence as a completed whole of meaning, and its
embeddedness within the flow of Erfahrung. An artwork's temporality is best defined through
the character of the "festival", because the concept of festival embodies the aspects of recurrence
and persistence that are integral to the nature of artworks.
The festival has a strong relation to play and Eljahrung, in that the unique temporality of
the festival is synonymous with the demarcation of a play-space. Festivals operate within a mode
oftime that is distinguished from the flow of time in general, but is not removed from it
completely. The event of the festival is not a part of practical, measured time, a view that regards
time as a formless entity, void of meaning until we carve out a space within it and fill that space
with our own plans. This use of time reflects the institution of the symbol, in which the subject
93Gadamer,RB,34.
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sets the goals that give time its "purpose". In the case of the festival, a section of time has
already been carved out for us, defining it as a moment that lacks purposiveness. This is not to
say that the festival is not the product of human intentionality, but festival exists for no other
purpose than the binding of a group for the sake of a celebration. At this point, the parallels to
the play-experience are made clear. As Gadamer writes:
We speak of "enacting" a celebration... [which] removes all idea ofa goal to be
attained. To enact is not to set out in order subsequently to arrive somewhere, for
when we enact a festival, then the festival is always there from the beginning. The
temporal character of the festive celebration that we enact lies in the fact that it
does not dissolve into a series of separate moments But all of this only takes
place for the sake of the festival that is being enacted the temporal structure of
the performance is [therefore] quite different from the time that simply stands at
ourdisposal.94
"Performance" in this case is taken to be synonymous with the presentation of play, and the
denial of "separate moments" clearly indicates that the festival's unifying nature is opposed to
the concept of Erlebnis. With regard to performance, this is the unity of movement that the
participants engage in, making the festival an act of celebration. What makes this possible,
however, is the recurring nature of the time in which the celebration plays out, which
distinguishes the festival from other activities that take place within the successive flow of
ordinary time. The structure of the celebration retains its consistency each time it is enacted, in
terms of when, where, and how the festival is to take place. This parallels the nature ofa game,
which can involve the same play-space, play-structure, and players each time it is played. But
94Gadamer,RB,41.
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what is unique to both the game and the festival, and what demarcates them from the ordinary
flow of time, is that something new is recognized and understood through every encounter with
them. No two festivals will ever play out in exactly the same manner, just as no two plays of a
game will involve exactly the same set of moves and countermoves. In the unity of presentation
provided by a game's play-structure, it gains the ability to repeat itself, but never with an
arrangement of players and movements identical to its previous instantiation. A new instantiation
of a festival is not a "different" festival from the one that came before, in the sense that an
entirely new festival is set before us, nor is it the symbolic representation of an "original"
celebration that happened prior to all the instantiations of it that followed. 95 To regard the festival
in these ways would be to define its experience as Erlebnis, or more accurately, Erlebnisse: a
series of disconnected, self-contained experiences, rather than the interconnected nature of
experience expressed by Erfahrung. Gadamer makes this clear:
The festival changes from one time to the next, for there are always other things
going on at the same time... but neither is [the festival] detem1ined by its origin so
that there was once the "real" festivaL.its own original essence is always to be
something different (even when celebrated in exactly the same way) ... [it] is
temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. It has its
being only in becoming and return.96
To become something and return again means that the thing returning is recognizable to us, and
that we can recognize what it is when it returns, even if it presents itself in a slightly different
way. As we established earlier, recognition is a result of Erfahrung, as it provides the continuity
95 Gadamer,TM,123.
96 Gadamer,TM,123.
60
of experience needed to perceive the true, actual relationships between the phenomena we
encounter. Therefore, a festival such as Thanksgiving, which has a particular means of
presenting itself through those who submit to this means, is not an event that becomes
increasingly distanced from the first celebration of Thanksgiving with each successive
celebration of it. Rather, every return of Thanksgiving is what allows Thanksgiving to present
itself in a new manner, each time it returns. Between the recognition of what came before, and
the confrontation of how it approaches us now, we are able to expand our understanding of that
thing, relating it to what we already know as we participate in its celebration, as a present event.
This is the process of our memory of the past being brought forward into the present, "the
constant interaction between our aims in the present and the past to which we still belong" that
shapes our understanding of the tradition to which we, and everything around us, are bound. 97
We have seen how a historical consciousness is helpful in revealing the past's influence on the
present. But the limitation of a historical consciousness is its tendency to view history as
something remote and isolated from the present. This is the historicist approach to history, which
Gadamer does not believe does justice to the claims history makes on the present, because it has
the character of a transposition rather than a fusion. Like aesthetic differentiation, historicism can
rob the events of history of their ontological valence, which immediately prevents the subject
from fusing their horizon with the tradition represented by those events. The struggle to both
accept and overcome the foreignness of history is not being engaged in, because in its zeal to
report historical events as objectively as possible, historicism makes no accommodation for how
contemporary events are formed by prior ones.98 As such, the historical events go under-
interpreted, and the subject understands them strictly in terms of whether they sit within or
9'Gadamer,RB,49.
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outside of their horizon of understanding. We can compare this approach to history with the
festival. It is possible to acknowledge the festival from a distance, and come to understand it only
in terms of the significance we have ascribed to it in advance. In this sense, we are not really
participating in the festival; for this would mean that we present it as a play-experience through
our participation, and such a distanced approach to what it represents would not make this a true
participation. Rather, this approach is a transposition into the festival, because we are refusing to
enter into the unique mode of time that brings the festival into being, as a recurring event.
Instead, we remain on the periphery, treating the festival as an instance of novelty within the
flow of time, without taking the risk of submitting to its structure, and experiencing its historical
significance through participation in it. In other words, the festival is no longer regarded as the
past brought into the present, but as a moment that we believe can be fully understood without
actually taking part in its presentation. What Gadamer is trying to show us is how the festival
encapsulates the play-experience's nature as the mediation of past and present, and how the
historically effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein) keeps us from
perceiving history as Erlebnisse, rebuffing aesthetic consciousness in the process.
The historically effected consciousness (which will be hereafter referred to as HEC) is
the subject's awareness of how their interpretation of the past is fundamentally influenced by
their present situation within history, and how their present situation is the product of the past.99
This view establishes the temporality of what we have learned about prejudices: they are the
result of what came before, and are therefore conditioned by these prior events. As our
exploration of language revealed, our prejudices are what provide us the point of entry we need,
in order to recognize an artwork's subject matter and "decode" the statement it makes. The
99 Bourgeois, GadamerandBalthasar, 75.
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awareness of the past that HEC stands for is what provides us with this recognition, and situates
the artwork within Erfahrung. Moreover, HEC also provides the insight needed to validate our
prejudices. This second point is more fully understood through the concept of lesen. Reading
what is set before us involves the use of things known to identity things unknown. Lesen is the
gathering of past and present phenomena together, the genuine conflation of things recognized in
both time periods that gives us the insight needed to assess our prejudices and achieve the
understanding this assessment provides. For an artwork, it is its "contemporaneity" that makes
this acquisition of knowledge possible.
"Contemporaneity" belongs to the being of the work of art. It constitutes the
essence of "being present." This is not the simultaneity of aesthetic
consciousness, for that simply means that several objects of aesthetic experience
(Erlebnis) are all held in consciousness at the same time-all indifferently, with
the sanle claim to validity. "Contemporaneity"... means that in its presentation
this particular thing that presents itself to us achieves full presence...Thus
contemporaneity is not a mode of givenness in consciousness, but a task for
consciousness and an achievement that is demanded of it. 100
Like the festival, interpretation is a process that demands the subject's participation, in order for
understanding to occur. Although the subject is not the one providing the festival with its true
meaning, they are still responsible for providing their subjective awareness of history to the
interpretive process, so that the festival's subject matter-the reason for its happening----ean be
recognized. HEC allows the subject to understand the contemporaneity of what the festival
presents, because the aspects of the past that inform its present situation must be recognized by
100 Gadamer, TM,l27.
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the subject in some way, before the subject is able to understand it. HEC also conditions our
experience of art, and allows our fusion with its horizons to occur. As the product of an artist's
intentions, the ontological properties of an artwork, as parts of Erfahrung, have a binding quality
for its subjects. The private, subjective experiences of Erlebnisse are no longer suitable for
defining interpretation; instead, it is the historical ground of tradition that allows the audience to
achieve commonality with the artwork's subject matter, and perceive the work as
contemporaneous, rather than as the voiceless fossil of a bygone era. 101 What this proves is the
importance of lesen for the interpretive process. The act of "recollection" that lesen signifies is,
in fact, the fusion of horizons, and is therefore a play-experience. The challenge an artwork tasks
us with is to understand and question the symbolic language it uses in making a claim both
about us and the world we are resigned to.
At this point, the congruence between defining lesen, HEC, play, symbol, and festival is
unavoidable: they are all different representations of the hermeneutic process of inquiry, the
infinite dialectic of question and answer ascribed to Gadamer at the beginning. But artworks,
with their ontological persistency, become much more than testaments to this process. What we
discover through HEC and the festival is that artworks are the physical representation of the
hermeneutic circle. In them are all the parts that constitute the whole of what they have to say, a
whole that can never be fully understood in its entirety. And just as language is used to
understand the subject matter that concerns something else, so that we can anticipate and receive
parts of that thing while staying mindful of its total essence, art challenges us with the proposal
of attempting to reach that essence through the symbolic language it employs. How do we define
the temporality of something like this, an entity that gives through representation, but the
,o'Gadamer,RB,40.
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meaning of which can never be exhaustively known? The answer is through festival. Each
encounter we have with an artwork regards the same artwork, but at a different point in our lives
than the prior encounter. Thus, the play-structure and historical horizons of the artwork remain
the same, but our interpretation of it will be different, given our understanding of the world that
surrounds both us and the artwork. In exactly the same way as the festival, the recurrence of our
contact with an artwork generates a new understanding of it. The reasons for the festival's
celebration do not change, but the participants, activities, and individual moments within the
celebration are entirely new. But this newness does not change the "fabric" of the festival,
because the intentions that caused it to come into being have remained, and offer themselves to
be recognized through the festival's presentation. Through HEC, we can distinguish between
what is new and what is carried over from the past, and this consciousness is what brings the
artworks of the past into our experience of the present, without denying the artwork its relation to
the historical period in which it was made. That a single encounter with an artwork does not
yield the full extent of its meaning is proof of its relation to the festival, and shows to what extent
the hermeneutic circle is incompatible with Erlebnis. The meaning of an artwork is revealed in a
new way with each successive encounter the subject has with it. Its significance cannot be fully
gleaned through one pure, precious moment of insight, divorced from the continuity of
experience, but through our active attempt to integrate the whole of Erfahrung with what an
artwork-be it picture, text, building or sculpture-is representing to us.
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Conclusion
An artwork is not interested in our opinion. Its existence is not something that cries out
for us, as subjects, to provide it with the sense it lacks. It is the result of an artist's sense, and it
carries within itself an intention that makes its representation understandable. In its disdain for
the authority of history, aesthetic consciousness wants us to believe otherwise. By keeping
aesthetic experience contained within its own, uniquely "aesthetic" domain, science is able to
lets its guard down. It no longer has to compete with the truth of art because we are being kept
from acknowledging artworks as the bearers of truth. The aesthetic differentiation that causes us
to perceive art as something outside the flow of history is what makes us feel responsible for its
meaning. Under aesthetic consciousness, the challenge to view art as something that speaks to us
is replaced with the challenge to view art as something that needs speakingfor. No longer is self-
understanding, as truth, the thing obtained through an encounter with an artwork. The subject
matter that binds the artwork and the subject together is overruled in favour of a strict subject-
object relationship, a transposition of horizons rather than a fusion. The subject is only interested
in the artwork insofar as it provides them with the novelty of something "other", and gives them
the opportunity to make claims about the artwork. No effort is being made to understand what
the artwork represents outside what the subject wants the artwork to represent. This is what
Gadamer believes is what comes of aesthetic consciousness; an encounter with art becomes the
equivalent ofa doctor's examination or an oral exam, in the sense that the subject only wants to
determine the nature of the artwork insofar as its otherness, and not be challenged to accept and
recognize the self-understanding it provides the subject with.
Taking what was laid out in the previous chapter, to view the encounter with art as a
festival event helps us engage in a play-experience with it. The artwork becomes for us a never-
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ending wellspring. It bubbles from the same place, but no subject will ever drink all the water it
has to offer, and the degree to which we are thirsty makes every experience of drinking it unique.
As it nourishes us, we learn something about our relationship to the water that it provides-how
it tastes to us, and how we react to being quenched by it. Every return to the same wellspring will
provide a new revelation of truth, in terms of how we understand ourselves in relation to what it
gives us, and the same is true of an artwork. The presentation an artwork provides is the water
we drink of the wellspring, and just as the essential properties of water do not change to give us a
new experience of drinking it, the presentation of an artwork is similarly bound to its ontological
makeup. So long as an artwork's presentation-manifestation is able to remain intact, it will serve
in the same capacity: as an eternal fountain of new understandings, that can be returned to
numerous times. Just as Erfahrung connects all human experiences together, every encounter
with an artwork is shaded by every previous encounter with it, along with all the other life
experiences we have had between those encounters.
By contrast, an Erlebnis-centric model of understanding hermetically seals every
aesthetic experience off from the rest of our experiences, keeping us from understanding their
truth. Under this model, we no longer allow ourselves to be filled by the self-understanding an
artwork provides. Instead, artworks are taken to be that which must be filled with meaning, and
we make claims about what this meaning is on the basis of our prejudices. The result is that our
prejudices remain unchallenged, limiting the size of our horizon of understanding. This is why
Gadamer's aesthetic theory is so dependent upon history and play-when the subject matter of
an artwork demands that we surrender our prejudices to the objective truth of history, in order to
understand what the work is saying, we can employ our HEC to link the subject matter with
things we recognize. This allows us to bring that which is unfamiliar closer to us, expanding our
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horizon of understanding to encompass those alien entities and concepts that once lived beyond
it. Through this process of understanding, art becomes an element of Erfahrung, and is able to
have meaning for us outside of an isolated, "precious" moment that only allows our prejudices to
be maintained, rather than revised. Memories, and our ability to relate what we remember to
what we encounter, are what give credence to an Erfahrung-centric model of understanding.
Gadamer's support of Erfahrung is not just to show how artworks possess continuity with
us, however. In the pursuit of self-understanding through art, what is truly gained is continuity
with ourselves. 102 Our situation within the world is more clearly understood when we are tasked
with understanding that which is foreign to us. This is the aspect of reality, and human
experience, that method cannot account for. Whereas method attempts to dictate a particular set
of rules that have a purposive outcome, art's outcome is only that it exists. How we come to
understand it is the challenge that it confronts us with. To rise to this challenge is to determine
how the artwork is situated in relation to us. In doing so, the play-experience of art is fully
realized, and the truth it reveals can be made known.
102 Gadamer,TM, 133.
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